Shaz & Kiks · Haircare · United States

Nobody in America knew what haldi was. So we taught them.

An Ayurvedic shampoo brand selling into the US. Product-led ads weren't landing, because the audience didn't understand the ingredient yet.

What they sellAyurvedic haircare
WhereUnited States
How long6 months
Ad spend$1,500 → $3,500/mo
Revenue growth+23%

Context

Shaz & Kiks sells Ayurvedic haircare into the US market, led by a turmeric (haldi) shampoo. I ran Meta end to end for six months — campaign structure, scaling, optimisation, and weekly creative direction. Meta drove approximately 90% of store revenue during the period.

Problem

Ayurvedic haircare is an education-first category in the US. The ingredients are unfamiliar to most of the target audience, which means a conventional product-led ad has to overcome a comprehension gap before it can overcome a purchase objection. Direct-response creative that simply showed the bottle and the offer did not carry that weight.

The commercial constraint was tight: monthly spend started at $1,500. There was no budget to buy reach and let frequency do the work. Efficiency had to come from the creative.

Hypothesis

If the audience doesn't know what haldi is, the ad has to teach before it sells. Founder-led educational video explaining the ingredient — what it is, where it comes from, what it does for hair fall — would convert better than product-forward creative, and would hold CPA as spend scaled, because education compounds where offers fatigue.

What I did

Founder-led ingredient education. Recorded video with the Indian founders explaining haldi directly: its origin, its traditional use, and the mechanism behind its effect on hair fall. This became the primary creative engine rather than a supporting asset.

Influencer application and results content. Before-and-after application videos from creators, used to close the credibility gap that founder education opened.

Video-only creative strategy. Every ad in the account was video. Static was not competitive in a category that requires explanation.

Weekly creative iteration and winner scaling. Reviewed performance weekly, identified winning angles, and scaled behind them rather than rotating a fixed creative set.

Launch and waitlist mechanics. Built new product launches around waitlists, which concentrated demand at launch and gave the account fresh, high-intent audiences to scale into — a second lever on CPA beyond creative alone.

Result

MetricMar – Sep 2024Change vs prior period
Total store revenue$230,389+23%
Orders~2,500+19%
Sessions108,690+7%
Conversion rate1.98%+16%
Average order value~$92+3%

Meta economics:

MetricValue
Monthly spend$1,500 scaling to $3,500
Total spend~$16,500
Meta-reported ROAS~7x
Blended MER (store revenue / total ad spend)~14x
Blended CAC~$6.60
CAC to AOV ratio1:14

Meta drove approximately 90% of store revenue over the period. Platform-reported ROAS sits well below blended MER, which is the expected gap under post-ATT attribution — the account was the primary revenue driver by a wide margin regardless of which figure you read.

The number that matters most is the split between traffic and conversion. Revenue grew 23% while sessions grew only 7%. Conversion rate contributed roughly twice as much to revenue growth as traffic did. Monthly spend more than doubled over the period and conversion rate went up 16% — the opposite of the usual pattern, where scaling into colder audiences costs efficiency.

Educational creative was the reason. Traffic arriving from a founder explaining the ingredient already understood what it was and why it worked, so it converted at a materially higher rate than traffic bought against a product shot.

Source data

Shopify analytics, Mar 1 – Sep 30 2024, compared against the preceding period.

Total sales — $230,389.70, up 23%
Total sales — $230,389.70, up 23%
Total orders — 2.5K, up 19%
Total orders — 2.5K, up 19%
Conversion rate — 1.98%, up 16% on 108.69K sessions, up 7%
Conversion rate — 1.98%, up 16% on 108.69K sessions, up 7%

What constrained the result

The sharp drop across all metrics in late September was a stockout, not a media failure. The hero SKU went out of stock and I had to redirect spend onto secondary products that had not been proving out. Revenue and conversion rate fell together, which is the signature of an inventory problem rather than an account problem.

The account had been scaling cleanly to that point. With inventory held, the trajectory in the charts through mid-September was the real run rate.

What I'd do next

What this demonstrates

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